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FINANCING BY ASSIGNMENT OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS: EXPANDING THE ASSIGNEE'S RISK*
ON the eve of World War II, when a large part of the nation's resources
were mobilized rapidly,' many new and small businesses needed to borrow
working capital in order to produce for the government. The Assignment of
Claims Act of 19402 was passed to permit these businesses to assign their
government contracts as security for loans. 3 Prior to the Act's passage,
assignment of Government contracts was prohibited by statute.4 The Act
reversed this legislative policy. In addition, it provided for protection of the
assignee against certain claims which might arise between the Government
and the assignor by permitting the inclusion of a clause in Navy, Army and
Air Force contracts to prohibit set-offs or reduction of payments to the
assignee for "any indebtedness of the assignor arising independently of such
contract." 5
* Comip. GEN. DEC. B-72929 (May 18, 1950), photostatic copy on file in Yale Law
Library; 18 U.S.L.WEEK 2530 (1950).
1. Government expenditures during the war amounted to roughly half of the gross
national product. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (Supp., July
1947). In 1949, prior to the contemporary remobilization activity, the figure was about one
quarter. MID-YEAR ECONO~lic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (Appendix A, July 1949).
2. 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1946). The statute limits
assignment in several ways: (1) the amount of the payments to be made on the contract
must aggregate at least $1,000; (2) the assignee must be a "financial institution"; (3) the
terms of a contract may forbid assignment; and (4) partial and successive assignments are
prohibited unless expressly permitted in the original contract.
3. "This bill opens the door of opportunity for small business concerns to bid on these
government contracts .... It will put idle money to work and give the little man a chance."
86 CONG. REc. 13122 (1940).
4. The policy was apparently to protect the Government against the nuisance of
divided and disputed claims. It was first crystallized in legislation in 1875. REv. STAT.
3477, 3737 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1946). The Government may waive the
statutory objection and recognize the assignee. McGowan v. Parish, 237 U.S. 285 (1915);
Nutt v. Knut, 200 U.S. 12 (1905).
The only prior use of assignments to facilitate private financing of Government con-
tracts was during the depression. One of the measures taken to encourage production and
thereby increase employment was statutory approval of assignment of W.P.A. contracts.
See 48 STAT. 205 (1933), 40 U.S.C. § 407 (1934).
5. "Any contract entered into by the Department of the Army, the Department of
the Air Force, or the Navy Department may provide that payments to an assignee of such
contract shall not be subject to reduction or set-off and if so provided such payments shall
not be subject to a reduction or set-off for any indebtedness of the assignor to the United
States arising independently of the contract designated in the assignment." 54 STAT. 1029
(1940), 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1946), as amended, 31 U.S.C.A. § 203 (Supp. 1950).
The provision was embodied in an amendment to the proposed statute introduced by
Senator Barkley during debate. 86 CONG. REc. 12803 (1940). In proposing the amendment,
Mr. Barkley stated: "A bank would not lend money on such a contract, even though it were
assigned to it, if it were laboring under the fear that when the work was over and they got
ready to collect their money from the contractor [sic] the government could come in and
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Such a clause was included in a contract6 made by the Navy Department
with the Graham Ship Repair Company by which Graham contracted to
repair naval vessels on a cost reimbursement basis. Graham assigned the
contract to the Central Bank of Oakland, and Central filed notice with the
Government as required by the Act.7 Later, Graham failed to pay em-
ployees' withholding taxes and unemployment taxes on wages earned in the
performance of the contract. This tax debt was deducted from the amount
due the assignee bank under the final payment voucher." The Comptroller
General affirmed the validity of the deduction.9 The tax debt, he held, had
not arisen "independently of the contract" because the contract on its face
contemplated the payment of wages, and thereby the payment of taxes on
those wages.' 0
In effect, this decision appears to take the position that the assignee takes
the risk of non-payment of any Government claim against the assignor
which the assignee can predict. This may logically extend beyond with-
holding and unemployment tax deficiencies. For example, under any cost-
plus contract, the assignee can predict that the contractor-assignor will
make a profit, owe federal income tax on that profit, and may default on
the tax liability thus incurred. Similarily, renegotiation claims n and crimi-
assert a claim against the contractor which had no relationship whatever to the contract
and the defense program." Ibid. Cf. 20 DEC. Coiip. GEN. 424 (1941) (holding that the word
"indebtedness" in the statutory clause included taxes, since permitting deduction of tax
claims despite the clause "undoubtedly would have the effect of seriously interfering with
the object which the provision in respect to set-off was intended to accomplish").
6. The contract is identified as NObs 10230. It was executed on December 30, 1944.
7. "4. That in the event of any such assignment, the Assignee thereof shall file written
notice of the assignment together with a true copy of the instrument of assignment with:
a) the General Accounting Office, b) the contracting officer or the head of his department or
agency, c) the surety or sureties upon the bond or bonds, if any, in connection with such
contract and d) the disbursing officer, if any, designated in such contract to make pay-
ments." 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1946).
8. The Graham Company owed $453,469.55 in withholding taxes and $11,462.91 in
federal unemployment taxes. At the time of the final voucher, $110,966.08 was due under
the contract.
9. Co xp. GEN. DEC. B-72929 (May 18, 1950), photostatic copy on file in Yale Law
Library; 18 U.S.L.WEEK 2530 (1950). A similar decision was made by the Comptroller
General on September 11, 1950. ComP. GEN. DEC. B-95362; 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2127 (1950).
See also Rhode Island Discount Co. v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 669 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
10. "[N]o obligations under the pertinent tax statutes can arise until wages are paid,
and the specific obligations here involved did not arise until wages were paid for the per-
-formance of service under the instant contract. Thus, the present indebtedness owes its
very existence to the performance of work under the assigned contract, and but for that
contract such debt would never have arisen.
"... It must have been apparent, also, that the stipulated contract compensation for
direct labor hours were fixed in consideration of the payment of the contractor of the taxes
involved." CoMP. GEN. DEC. B-72929, p. 4 (May 18, 1950), supra note 9.
11. See 56 STAT. 245 (1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 1191 (1946). A revised act is
pending. H.R. 1724,82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). See note 24 infra.
CoMP. GEN. DEC. B-99808 (Dec. 26, 1950), 19 U.S.L.WEEK 2294 (1951), stated that the
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nal fines or other penalties arising from defrauding the Government 12 are
potential liabilities, the possibility of which may be foreseen from the face
of the contract. Under the Comptroller-General's rationale, the assignee
must take the risk that the assignor may default on such obligations.' 3
This interpretation of the "no reduction" clause may severely limit as-
signment financing of Government contracts. If the risk of defaults such
as Graham's is imposed on the assignee in addition to the risks presently
peculiar to Government contracts because of their repricing and termination
provisions,' 4 lending institutions may find Government assignments un-
profitable. Protection against the risk would require supervision of the
assignor's accounting and payment system. 5 Where the assignor's entire
question as to the government's right of set-off of renegotiation claims against assignees
had not been the subject of a decision. Since there had been some fear that an earlier deci-.
sion allowing deductions for amounts due to repricing, ComP. GEN. DEC. B-84138 (May 17,
1949), would be extended to renegotiation claims, the Comptroller General explained that
the repricing decision was restricted to the factual situation presented.
12. See, e.g., 62 STAT. 749 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1950).
13. The assignee would, of course, have a claim over against his assignor. The actual
value of the claim, however, would probably be slight, since the assignor would presumably
have been in an extremely unstable financial position to have defaulted in the first place.
Cf. Rhode Island Discount Co. v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 669 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
When the assignor is in an unstable financial condition, an additional reason for putting
the risk of non-payment on the Government is that it is in a much better position to collect.
If the assignor becomes a bankrupt, the Government's claim will constitute a prior lien on
his assets. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), as amended 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (Supp. 1950). An assignee
bank, on the other hand, would be merely an unsecured creditor.
14. See 58 STAT. 92 (1944), 50 U.S.C. § 1191, § 1192 (Appendix 1946). Repricing differs
from renegotiation in that it is applied only to protect the Government against "unreason-
able or unfair" prices on a single specific contract. Renegotiation, on the other hand, is
designed to eliminate excessive profits from the total income of the contractor, regardless
of a small profit, or even a loss, or any particular contract. See note 11 supra.
The Graham contract contained the usual termination clause by which the Navy may
terminate the contract if performance is unsatisfactory.
15. A bank's usual credit check of a prospective assignor should, of course, reveal any
current tax liabilities which might affect the original decision to take an assignment. See
Granger, Ghosts of Unpaid Taxes, BANKING 51, 119 (July, 1950). The problem raised by the
Graham case, however, relates solely to tax indebtedness arising subsequent to the assign-
ment. Here even a meticulous check before each advance of credit would not be enough.
Refusal to make further advances upon discovery of non-payment would probably force
the contractor to cease work before completion of the contract, and thereby reduce the
bank's claim against the Government. In order to avoid this, the bank must do more than
uncover non-payment; it must see to it that taxes are paid as they fall due.
As a matter of policy, the Navy Department would exercise its power of termination
if the contractor failed to comply with the tax laws. To escape such termination, Graham
perpetrated a successful fraud on the Department. "The contractor (Graham Ship Re-
pair Co.) when challenged by the Navy Department as to the payment of taxes, presented
a check punched and cancelled by the Collector of Internal Revenue in the amount of
$350,000.00. The contractor stated to the Navy Department that this check was his receipt
for payment of taxes then due the Collector of Internal Revenue. This check was never
presented to the Collector of Internal Revenue. It did, however, represent a considerable
effort on the part of the contractor to deceive the Navy Department and had the effect of
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production is relegated to one government contract, policing might be rela-
tively simple. The bank could have itself designated depositary 16 for with-
holding taxes, and then hold in a trust account a portion of its periodic
advances to the assignor sufficient to cover the estimated tax liability. But
in the more usual case, where other contracts or non-Government work are
also involved, the accounting difficulties in allocating tax to a particular
contract would be almost unsurmountable. In either case, the process would
be expensive to the bank, and therefore, to the assignor.
Rather than undertake such an aggressive role, it is probable that banks
will change their lending policy.'7 They may decrease drastically the amount
they are willing to advance on an assigned contract and thus shorten the
shoestring on which the small contractor works. Or, banks may simply
refuse to give loans to unknown or shaky concerns. This would increase the
demand for guarantees from the agencies under the Federal Reserve Board,18
and thus, to the extent that the guarantee system met that demand, enhance
the risk to the Government and the cost to the contractor.
The "no reduction" clause can be interpreted so as to avoid these results.
At common law, the obligor on an assigned contract can set off against the
assignee's claim obligations of the assignor arising subsequent to notice of
the assignment only if they are part of the same transaction.19 The statutory
continuing the job orders from the Navy." Comp. GEN. DEC. B-72929 (May 18, 1950),
supra note 9 at 2.
16. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 116, § 405.606 (1949).
17. It has been reported that banks are refusing to accept assignments. The American
Banker, October 19, 1950; id. March 2, 1951. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1951, F, p. 1. ("Amend-
ment of the statutes affecting the so-called 'V' loans for defense production, now being con-
sidered by Congress, is certain to release a flood of these essential credits, according to
banking sources. Already, a vast aggregate of such loan applications is on file with banks,
awaiting clarification of the situation . . .").
18. The Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 774, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 8,
1950), provides for loan guarantees under certain circumstances to help borrowers who can-
not otherwise obtain loans because of inability to furnish adequate security. The President
is empowered to authorize defense procurement agencies ". . . to guarantee .. .any...
financing agencies . . .against loss of principal or interest on any loan .. .made for the
purpose of financing any contractor . . . in connection with the performance ... of any
contract .. .for the procurement of services for the national defense."
Regulations have been issued by the Federal Reserve Bank under this Act and Execu-
tive Order No. 10,161 § 302(c), 15 FED. REG. 6105 (1950), setting up a loan guarantee pro-
gram similar to that used during World War II, Federal Reserve Board Regulation V, 15
FED. REG. 6630 (1950). When a contractor is unable to get a loan by assigning his govern-
ment contract, he may request that a financial institution apply to the Federal Reserve
Bank for a guarantee of the loan. Whether such guarantees are requested by the banks and
loans made on the strength of them to small businessmen depends on terms of the guarantee
agreement, including how much of the loan is covered by the guarantee. World War II
guarantees were for 50% to 90% of the loaned amount. For discussion of the regulations,
see Emerson, Federal Guarantee of Business Loans, 64 HAsv. L. REv. 615 (1951).
19. E.g., Blog v. Burden Co., 238 App. Div. 634, 265 N.Y.Supp. 81 (2d Dep't 1933).
See 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 896-7 (1951); 2 Wn.LISTON, CONrRACTS § 433 (1936). The
rule has been honored by the Comptroller General under the Assignment of Claims Act.
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clause merely extends this rule to prior claims. As to subsequent claims
such as those involved in the Graham case,2° the clause should be interpreted
to treat the Government exactly as if it were a private party. 21 Reductions
should be restricted to those claims which a private obligor could normally
assert against an assignee: failure of consideration, breach of warranty, un-
satisfactory work, and the like. 22 Claims such as taxes, which accrue to the
Government because it is the Government rather than because it is a con-
tracting party, should be excluded under this test as "independent of the
contract."2
The need for such an interpretation has already given rise to pressure for
legislative revision of the Assignment of Claims Act to prohibit reduction
of assignees' claims by tax and like indebtedness owed the Government
See 20 DEC. CoMP. GEN. 458, 459 (1941), in which the Comptroller-General stated: "While
an assignee . . . takes the assignment subject to any existing right of set-off, his rights
under the assignment are not affected by independent claims subsequently accruing in favor
of the Government against his assignor. That is to say, a debtor cannot set-off rights ac-
quired under other transactions subsequent to the date of receipt of notice of a valid assign-
ment. [Citing cases.]" The contracts under consideration in that opinion did not contain
the "no reduction" clause.
20. Notice of assignment was filed January 31, 1945. The tax debt was incurred during
1945 and 1946.
21. See United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944) ("in general, the
United States as a contractor must be treated as other contractors under analogous situa-
tions"). Cf. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1924) (United States sued as vendee of
silk, held not liable for obstruction to the performance of the contract resulting from its
general embargo on shipments of silk).
22. Reductions of this type are known as "recoupment." See WATERMAN, SET-OFF
480-484 (2d ed. 1872); CLARK, CODE PLEADING 633-5 (2d ed. 1947). See, generally, Clark
and Surback, The Pleading of Counterclaims, 37 YALE L.J. 300 (1927). The policy of allow-
ing recoupment of defaults occurring after notice of assignment seems just. Even though
assignments are favored, they should not force payment at the full contract price for a
contract performed either unsatisfactorily or not at all. For history and analysis of recoup-
ment, see Loyd, The Development of Set-Off, 64 U. OF PA. L. REv. 541 (1916); Note, Recoup-
ment-Set-off-and Counterclaim, 28 W. VA. L. Q. 139 (1921).
Most modern codes do not distinguish between recoupment and the other forms of
counterclaims. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13. But a distinction may still be called for in
some situations. For example, Professor Moore suggests using it as the proper basis for
segregating compulsory from permissible counterclaims. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTISE 9,
n. 1 (1949). Moreover, in tax litigation, the Supreme Court has required a counterclaim to
meet recoupment criteria where the Government would have been barred by the statute of
limitations from bringing an original action. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532 (1937) (recoup-
ment allowed against trustee for amount owed by beneficiary). See Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247, 261 (1935). And when the sovereign sues, it is considered to submit to the
court's jurisdiction for only "such adverse claims as have arisen out of the same transaction
which gave rise to the sovereign's suit. . . . A defendant's right in such regard is one of
recoupment." In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d 864,869 (3d Cir. 1944). See Note,
50 COL. L. REv. 505 (1950).
23. Cf. In re Monongahela Rye Liquors, 141 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1944) (trustee's
claim for the price of liquor sold by the bankrupt to the State Liquor Control Board held
not recoupable since "manifestly unrelated" to the State's claim for corporation taxes).
See note 5 supra.
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